Effects of Iranian economic reforms on equity in social and healthcare financing: A segmented regression analysis by Zandian, H. et al.
Journal of 
Preventive Medicine 
& Public Health
83Copyright © 2018  The Korean Society for Preventive Medicine
Journal of 
Preventive Medicine 
& Public Health
PB Copyright © 2018  The Korean Society for Preventive Medicine
J Prev Med Public Health 2018;51:83-91 • https://doi.org/10.3961/jpmph.17.050
Effects of Iranian Economic Reforms on Equity in Social 
and Healthcare Financing: A Segmented Regression 
Analysis
Hamed Zandian1,2, Amirhossein Takian2,3, Arash Rashidian2, Mohsen Bayati4, Telma Zahirian Moghadam5, Satar Rezaei6, 
Alireza Olyaeemanesh2,7
1Social Determinants of Health Research Center, Ardabil University of Medical Sciences, Ardabil, Iran; 2Department of Health Management and  
Economics, School of Public Health, Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran; 3Department of Global Health and Public Policy, School of 
Public Health, Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran; 4Health Human Resources Research Center, School of Management and  
Information Sciences, Shiraz University of Medical Sciences, Shiraz, Iran; 5Health Management and Economics Research Center, Iran University of 
Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran; 6Research Center for Environmental Determinants of Health, Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences,  
Kermanshah, Iran; 7National Institute of Health Research, Group of Payment and Financial Resources of the Health System, Tehran University of 
Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran
Original Article
Objectives: One of the main objectives of the Targeted Subsidies Law (TSL) in Iran was to improve equity in healthcare financing. This 
study aimed at measuring the effects of the TSL, which was implemented in Iran in 2010, on equity in healthcare financing.
Methods: Segmented regression analysis was applied to assess the effects of TSL implementation on the Gini and Kakwani indices of 
outcome variables in Iranian households. Data for the years 1977-2014 were retrieved from formal databases. Changes in the levels 
and trends of the outcome variables before and after TSL implementation were assessed using Stata version 13. 
Results: In the 33 years before the implementation of the TSL, the Gini index decreased from 0.401 to 0.381. The Gini index and its in-
tercept significantly decreased to 0.362 (p<0.001) 5 years after the implementation of the TSL. There was no statistically significant 
change in the gross domestic product or inflation rate after TSL implementation. The Kakwani index significantly increased from -0.020 
to 0.007 (p<0.001) before the implementation of the TSL, while we observed no statistically significant change (p=0.81) in the Kak-
wani index after TSL implementation.
Conclusions: The TSL reform, which was introduced as part of an economic development plan in Iran in 2010, led to a significant re-
duction in households’ income inequality. However, the TSL did not significantly affect equity in healthcare financing. Hence, while 
measuring the long-term impact of TSL is paramount, healthcare decision-makers need to consider the efficacy of the TSL in order to 
develop plans for achieving the desired equity in healthcare financing. 
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INTRODUCTION
Spiraling healthcare expenditures, due to expensive modern 
medical technologies and citizens’ ever-increasing expecta-
tions, may lead to challenges such as catastrophic health ex-
penditures and inequality in access to healthcare [1]. Health 
systems have been attempting to improve and maintain pop-
ulation welfare through contextually appropriate models of 
healthcare financing. Nevertheless, financial shortages have 
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consistently hampered the achievement of these objectives 
[2]. Ensuring equity in health financing is an important objec-
tive of healthcare systems [3]. Many studies in recent years in 
developing countries, including Iran, have emphasized the 
importance of equity in healthcare financing [4,5]. 
The main source of primary healthcare financing in Iran is 
the public sector. The private and public sectors simultaneous-
ly provide secondary and tertiary service delivery and financ-
ing [4]. Thus, healthcare financing in Iran is complex and mul-
tifaceted. Despite reforms to improve equity in healthcare fi-
nancing, such as the implementation of a family physician 
program and, recently, the Health Transformation Plan [6], the 
proportion of out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures is still 
high [7,8]. Healthcare financing indicators, such as out-of-
pocket and catastrophic health expenditures, did not show a 
clear trend or status, and were not at appropriate levels in Iran 
during the last decades [9,10]. For instance, approximately 
58% of health expenditures were out-of-pocket in 2001, and 
10 years later, in 2011, this figure decreased to 52% [8]. More-
over, several national-level studies have shown that the con-
centration index (CI) for capacity to pay and healthcare pay-
ments implied inequality [5,11] and that annually, healthcare 
expenditures caused almost 1.8% of the society’s population 
fall below the poverty line [12]. The fair financing contribution 
index in 2006 was approximately 0.854, and it dropped to 0.842 
in 2011 [13]. In general, these measures indicate the complex-
ity and multidimensionality of healthcare financing in Iran.
Recently, the Iranian government has focused attention on 
ensuring equitable healthcare financing by developing the 
Targeted Subsidies Law (TSL). The TSL was the most important 
economic reform in Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1978, 
and made Iran the first major oil-exporting country to sub-
stantially reduce implicit energy subsidies [14]. The implemen-
tation of the TSL began in 2010, when the government elimi-
nated energy subsidies (i.e., the subsidy for gas and oil) and 
replaced them with cash payments to eligible citizens. As a re-
sult of this reform, domestic energy and agricultural prices in-
creased by up to 20 times [14]. In the first 12 months following 
TSL implementation (December 2011), approximately USD 30 
billion in freely usable cash was distributed to Iranian house-
holds, and another USD 10-15 billion will have been advanced 
to enterprises to finance investment in restructuring aimed at 
reducing energy intensity. Additionally, during this time, the 
reform planned to raise only an estimated 200 trillion rials 
(USD 20 billion) in additional revenues to compensate for 
price increases [14,15].
One of the main purposes of the TSL was to reduce income 
inequality by decreasing the income gap across deciles, aim-
ing to combat and reduce poverty [16]. Paragraph B of Article 
7 of the TSL directly notes the government is bound to imple-
ment a comprehensive social security system for the targeted 
population, by taking measures such as: (1) providing and ex-
panding social insurance and healthcare services, and ensur-
ing and enhancing public health and medical coverage for 
special and difficult-to-cure diseases; (2) providing assistance 
for financing housing costs, enhancing resistance of buildings, 
and creating employment; and (3) empowering and imple-
menting social support programs by allocating funds from ris-
ing prices for energy carriers to the health sector in order to 
ensure equity in healthcare financing [17].
A qualitative study reported the challenges posed by the 
unpredictability of healthcare financing in Iran [18] to be one 
of the reasons for high out-of-pocket payments. The govern-
ment of Iran introduced the TSL to ensure a more sustainable 
and equitable healthcare financing system, among other 
goals. Little evidence is available to demonstrate the impact of 
the TSL on equity in healthcare financing in Iran. This study 
aimed to measure the effects of TSL implementation on in-
come inequality and equity in healthcare financing in Iran. 
METHODS
Study Setting 
Iran is a middle-income country of almost 80 million citizens 
that is located in west Asia. The gross national income per capita 
for Iran is about 15.410 purchasing power paritie dollars and 
total health expenditures account for approximately 6.9% of 
the gross domestic product (GDP). The total expenditure on 
health per capita (international $, 2014) is 1.082 [19].
Based on what is articulated in upstream documents, such 
as the Law of the Fourth Economic, Social, and Cultural Devel-
opment Plan, improving equity in healthcare financing is one 
of the main goals of the Iranian health system [20]. The TSL, 
which was implemented in 2010, is considered to be one of 
the reforms that covered entire social sectors, such as the health-
care system, with the aim of ensuring equity.
Study Design
Segmented regression analysis, a powerful method of inter-
rupted time series analysis [21], was conducted to estimate the 
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effect of the TSL on income inequality and equity in healthcare 
financing. We used segmented regression analysis to assess 
the extent to which the TSL brought changes to these indica-
tors immediately during the intervention period and over a 
longer time period (1977-2014). In this analysis, the time of 
the intervention was considered to be the changing point. We 
assumed that the TSL implementation had positive effects on 
equity in healthcare financing in Iran.
Variables
In this study, the Gini index (GI) and Kakwani index (KI) were 
the main outcome variables, while the GDP, inflation rate (InR), 
infant mortality rate (IMR), and the proportion of the popula-
tion 60 years old (PoU60) and above were the control vari-
ables. The data for the years 1977 to 2014 were retrieved from 
the annual household income-expenditures survey reports of 
the National Statistics Center of Iran, the Ministry of Health 
and Medical Education, and the World Bank’s official website. 
The annual household income-expenditures survey data of 
the National Statistics Center of Iran are believed to be of the 
required quality. These data have also been used by other 
studies on healthcare equity and household expenditures on 
healthcare [4]. The data include detailed measures of house-
hold expenditures on goods and services such as healthcare, 
as well as household income. The healthcare expenditure data 
distinguish consumer co-payments from health insurance pre-
miums, enabling us to calculate inequality measures for these 
2 items separately, as well as together [4,12].
The GI was computed using the annual household income-
expenditures survey reports and the annual aggregated num-
ber of households from 1977 to 2014. This was carried out as a 
preliminary analysis to determine the effect of the TSL on in-
come inequality using segmented regression analysis. The GI 
can be mathematically expressed as follows: 
Where the GI represents the aggregated GI; yi is the ith de-
cile of household income, yi+1 is the (i+1)th decile of the next 
household income, χi is the number of households, and χi+1 is 
the number of the next households in the (i+1)th decile [22]. 
Furthermore, the KI, which shows the progressivity of 
healthcare financing, was calculated using the following for-
mula.
              KI=CI-GI
Where CI is the concentration index and GI is the Gini index. 
The CI, which is a widely applied technique in health econom-
ic studies [23], was calculated to measure the inequality in to-
tal household expenditures on healthcare from 1988 to 2014. 
This period was used because household expenditures on 
healthcare data as deciles were available starting in 1988. This 
index corresponds to the area between the concentration 
curve and the perfect equality line (45°). A CI of 0 shows an 
absence of inequality between the rich and the poor; a posi-
tive value indicates that the concentration curve lies below 
the perfect equality line, implying a pro-rich inequality; and a 
negative value shows inequality in favor of the poor [24]. 
Overall, the CI can be represented mathematically as follows 
[25]: 
Where  represents the cumulative percentage declines in 
population income and  household expenditures on health-
care, respectively. 
The KI was calculated from the GI and CI models presented 
in equations 1 and 2, respectively, as a basis for the segmented 
regression analysis. The computed KI values range from -2 to 1. 
A value of -2 shows severely regressive healthcare financing 
and a value of 1 indicates strongly progressive healthcare fi-
nancing [25]. Generally, the area between the concentration 
curve and the Lorenz curve represents the KI [25].
Control Variables
The GDP is one of many macroeconomic indicators, and it 
usually has an effect on other economic variables [24]. The InR 
is another independent variable that can affect other econom-
ic variables. The InR in Iran has been very high during the past 
3 decades [26]. High inflation can occur when there is an im-
balance between the availability of commodities in society 
and the amount of cash in circulation. It can also be affected 
by economic reforms. Hence, the annual GDP and 12-month 
average InR for the years 1977-2014 were used as control vari-
ables for the analysis. 
Furthermore, the number of deaths among under-1-year-
old children per 1000 live births (the IMR) for the years 1977-
2014 and the proportion of people aged 60 years and above 
for the years 1988-2014 were included in our analysis as con-
trol variables related to health system outcome indicators. 
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Modeling the Segmented Regression Analysis
We used the backward approach to estimate the effect of 
the TSL on income inequality and equity in healthcare financ-
ing. Initially, the GI was calculated to estimate the effect of the 
TSL on total income inequality. This is mathematically present-
ed as follows: 
Where yGIt represents the GI at year t,  is the GI trend 
before the intervention,  is the change in the intercept 
changes of the GI after intervention,  is the trend 
changes after the intervention, GDP represents the gross do-
mestic product, InR is the inflation rate, and et is the random 
variability that is not explained by the model. 
Furthermore, the KI was calculated to determine the effect 
of the TSL on the equity in healthcare financing. This is pre-
sented in the equation below.
Where yKIt is the KIakwani index as an indicator of health-
care financing equity indicator at year t; IMR is the infant mor-
tality rate, and PoU60 is the ratio of the population over the 
age of 60 years. 
Furthermore, the absolute effect of the TSL intervention on 
income inequality (GI) (equation 8) was calculated by subtract-
ing the value of equation 7 from the value of equation 6. This 
is mathematically presented as follows. 
Statistical Analysis 
A segmented regression analysis was carried out on the cal-
culated values of the GI and KI to determine the effects of the 
TSL, which was implemented in 2010. The analysis was con-
ducted to see whether there were changes in the level and 
trend of these variables during, before, and after the imple-
mentation of the TSL. The effect of the intervention was de-
tected by comparing the value of the intercept and trend be-
fore and after the intervention [21]. To detect the effect of an 
intervention using segmented regression analysis, at least 3 
time series observations before and 3 times series observa-
tions after are required [27]. Accordingly, this analysis applied 
33 yearly GI observations before and 5 yearly GI observations 
after the intervention. Similarly, we used 22 yearly KI observa-
tions before and 5 yearly KI observations after the intervention 
(Table 1). The stepwise elimination method was used to ex-
clude non-significant independent variable from the fitted 
model. Hence, the model from which all non-significant vari-
ables were removed could be considered parsimonious. 
The final fitted model was assessed for autocorrelation, co-
integration of the variables, and any spurious regression. Thus, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic was estimated on the residuals of 
the fitted model. Results closer to 2 indicate the absence of 
autocorrelation [28]. This test yielded nonstationary results for 
almost all the variables (Tables 2 and 3). The Breusch-Pagan 
diagnostic test for heteroscedasticity was also done on the re-
Table 1. Trends of the Gini index, concentration index, Kakwani index, gross domestic product (GDP), inflation rate, infant mor-
tality rate (IMR), and proportion of the population over 60 years, 1977-2014
Year 1977-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Gini index1 0.401 0.401 0.397 0.401 0.381 0.372 0.365 0.365 0.362
GDP2 5273.70 14 710.80 210 864.50 2.10E+06 5.5E+06 5.80E+06 5.80E+06 5.30E+08 5.30E+08
Inflation rate3 15.51 19.53 24.03 14.75 12.42 21.53 30.51 34.74 27.53
IMR4 87.61 58.72 36.62 22.53 16.56 15.74 15.12 14.46 13.71
60 y4 3.04 2.99 3.71 4.77 5.16 5.20 5.24 5.28 5.29
Concentration index5 - - 0.371 0.381 0.388 0.368 0.389 0.388 0.370
Kakwani index5 - - 0.0256 -0.0216 0.007 -0.001 0.024 0.023 0.008
1From Iran Statistical Center report, 2014.
2From World Bank Report 2014.
3From Central Bank of Iran.
4From Deputy of Treatment of Ministry of Health Report 2014.
5Calculated by authors.
6Mean over 10 years.
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siduals. The null hypothesis (H0) of this test was that the vari-
ances of the variables were same, and the decision was made 
at p-values less than 0.05. Finally, the Shapiro-Wilk W test was 
performed to assess the normality of the residuals. 
The findings are presented as numeric, percentage, and 
mean values and are presented graphically and in tables. All 
analyses were performed using Stata version 13 (StataCorp., 
College Station, TX, USA). 
Ethics Statement
The Research and Ethics Committee of Tehran University of 
Medical Sciences approved the protocol of this study on Au-
gust 12, 2014 (no. 9021557003). 
RESULTS
The GI during the time series period (1977 to 2014) had a 
negative trend (Table 1). The mean GI decreased from 0.401 in 
the 1980s to 0.381 in 2010, and then to 0.362 in 2014. The 
maximum level of the GI was 0.401 in the 1980s and the mini-
mum level was 0.362 in 2014. The GDP increased over time 
between 1977 and 2014. The average InR increased from 
15.51% in 1977-1980 to 24.03% in 1990-2000, and then de-
creased to 12.42% during 2000-2010. The maximum and mini-
mum InR were 24.03 and 12.42%, respectively. The IMR de-
creased over time, while the proportion of PoU60 increased, 
from 3.04% in 1977 to 5.29% in 2014. 
Furthermore, the CI showed that inequality in healthcare 
expenditures decreased from 1988 to 2014. However, the 
trend of the CI showed considerable oscillation. The highest CI 
was in 2012 and the lowest was in 2011. The KI also showed 
fluctuating findings, although improvements in the indices 
were noted after 2012. The average KI of healthcare financing 
during the first 10 years (1990-2000) was more equitable 
(K=0.025) than was observed in the last 10 years before the 
implementation of the TSL (2000-2009, K=-0.021). We found 
no statistically significant effect on equity in healthcare financ-
ing after the implementation of the TSL. Nevertheless, the 
general trend of the KI during the TSL implementation period 
showed an increase, from -0.050 to 0.001. 
The segmented regression analysis estimated the GI of the 
different models, as shown in Table 2. The most parsimonious 
model showing the effect of the TSL on income inequality was 
model D. The F statistic value (31.17) and adjusted coefficient 
of determination (R2=73.3%) in this model were higher than 
in the other models. There was a statistically significant 
(p<0.001) decrease in the slope of the mean GI before the in-
Table 2. Parameter estimates of segmented regression analysis models of the effects of TSL implementation on income inequal-
ity (Gini index) in Iran, 1977-2014 (year of intervention, 2010)
Explanatory variables Goodness of fit Residual tests
Intercept Tbefore CCafter TCafter lGDP InR F R-2 RMST DF NO DW B-P
Models A
p-value
0.374 
<0.001
-0.001 
0.07
-0.008 
0.38
-0.008
 0.03
0.003
 0.12
-0.000
 0.76
19.58 
<0.001
0.00717 0.0071 -4.859 0.967 
0.32
1.628 1.08 
0.30
B 
p-value
0.373 
<0.001
-0.001 
0.06
-0.008 
0.39
-0.008 
0.02
0.004
 0.11
-
-
25.15 
<0.001
0.00707 0.0070 -4.793 0.964 
0.26
1.604 1.06
0.30
C 
p-value
0.405 
<0.001
-0.000 
0.14
-0.017 
0.05
-0.003 
0.11
-
-
-0.000
 0.70
22.83 
<0.001
0.00733 0.0073 -4.613 0.965 
0.28
1.510 1.43
0.23
D 
p-value
0.404 
<0.001
-0.000
 0.14
-0.016 
0.05
-0.004 
0.08
-
-
-
-
31.17 
<0.001
0.00723 0.0072 -4.513 0.964 
0.27
1.473 1.34
0.25
Most parsimonious  
  model 
0.401 
<0.001
-
-
-0.032 
<0.001
-
-
-
-
-
-
79.53 
<0.001
0.00761 0.0076 -3.770 0.886 
<0.001
1.472 1.47
0.24
TSL, Targeted Subsidies Law; Tbefore, time trend before intervention; CCafter, intercept changes after intervention; TCafter, trend changes after the intervention; lGDP, 
log gross domestic product; InR, inflation rate; RMST, restricted mean survival time; DF, stationary of residuals with the Dicky-Fuler test; NO, normality of residuals 
with the Shapiro-Wilk W test; DW, Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation; B-P, Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity.
0.42
0.40
0.38
0.36
 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
TSL begun
Fitted values
Glni Co before
Fitted values
Gini Co after
Gi
ni
 C
o
Figure 1. The distribution of Gini Index during the study time 
(1977–2014). Co, coefficient; TSL, Targeted Subsidies Law.
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tervention (1977 to 2010). Immediately after the intervention 
of the TSL, the level of the mean GI dropped by -0.032, showing 
a statistically significant (p<0.001) immediate reduction in in-
come inequality, although there was no significant change in 
the slope of the mean GI during the period after the interven-
tion (2010 to 2014, p=0.08) (Table 2). Thus, the TSL implemen-
tation led to a reduction of the GI by 0.08, but the effect of the 
TSL on reducing income inequality was very small (Figure 1). 
Effect of the Targeted Subsidies Law on Equity 
in Healthcare Financing
The segmented regression analysis revealed that the TSL did 
not have any statistically significant effect on the level or trend 
of the KI in either of the models (Table 3). The F statistic of the 
KI model D showed it to be a well-fitted model (F=31.17, p<  
0.001) and the index before the intervention was decreasing 
to a significant extent (p<0.001), by 0.07 annually. Our study 
revealed no statistically significant change in the trend of KI 
after the implementation of the TSL (Figure 2). Over time, 
there was a negligible but statistically significant (p<0.001) 
positive effect of the InR on the KI. 
DISCUSSION 
The TSL was a recent reform that was implemented in Iran in 
2010 [29]. This reform was part of the economic development 
plan of the country, the fundamental aim of which was to re-
duce income inequality among Iranian households and to im-
prove equity in healthcare financing by implementing com-
prehensive social security [14]. The GI, InR, and GDP are indica-
tors that are strongly influenced by economic conditions [30]. 
The findings of this study revealed that TSL implementation 
had a positive effect on the GI in Iran. The GI showed a nega-
tive trend in income inequality before the implementation of 
the TSL, which may indicate a gradual decline in income in-
equality over time. However, this was not statistically signifi-
cant. Income inequality decreased immediately after the im-
plementation of the TSL. Evidence has been found of a correla-
tion between income inequality and healthcare outcomes 
[31]. Another study likewise reported a relationship between 
income inequality and increased stroke mortality [32]. 
Our study found no statistically significant relationships be-
tween the GI and the InR and GDP after the implementation 
Table 3. Parameter estimates of segmented regression analysis models of the effects of TSL implementation on inequality in 
healthcare financing (Kakwani index) in Iran, 1988-2014 (year of intervention, 2010)
Models
Explanatory variables Goodness of fit Residual tests
Intercept Tbefore CCafter TCafter lGDP IMR PoU60 InR F R-2 RMST ST NO DW B-P
A 
p-value
-0.02
0.95
0.01
0.33
0.01 
0.67
-0.01 
0.53
0.00 
0.98
0.00 
0.91
-0.06 
0.17
0.00 
0.13
5.95
<0.001
0.69 0.01 -5.20 0.78
<0.001
2.16 0.37
0.54
B 
p-value
0.02
0.94
0.01
0.32
0.01 
0.62
-0.01 
0.37
-
-
0.000 
0.91
-0.06 
0.16
0.00 
0.12
7.31
<0.001
0.59 0.01 -5.20 0.78
<0.001
2.16 0.38
0.54
C 
p-value
0.48
0.57
0.01
0.06
0.01 
0.55
-0.01 
0.27
-
-
-
-
-0.06 
0.14
0.00 
0.11
9.20
<0.001
0.61 0.01 -5.19 0.78
<0.001
2.15 0.34
0.52
D 
p-value
-0.07
<0.001
0.00 
<0.001
0.01 
0.36
-0.00 
0.70
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.00 
0.05
31.17
<0.001
0.73 0.01 -4.77 0.81
<0.001
1.97 0.56
0.45
E 
p-value
-0.05
 <0.001
0.00 
<0.001
0.01 
0.41
0.00 
0.81
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11.68
<0.001
0.55 0.01 -3.37 0.84
<0.001
1.62 0.33
0.56
TSL, Targeted Subsidies Law; Tbefore, time trend before intervention; CCafter, intercept changes after intervention; TCafter, trend changes after the intervention; lGDP, 
log gross domestic product; IMR, infant mortality rate; PoU60, proportion of the population 60 years old; InR, inflation rate;  RMST, restricted mean survival time; 
DF, stationary of residuals with the Dicky-Fuler test; NO, normality of residuals with the Shapiro-Wilk W test; DW, Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation; B-P, 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity.
0.02
0.00
-0.02
-0.04
-0.06
-0.08
 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
TSL begun
Fitted values
Kakwani before
Fitted values
Kakwani after
KI
Figure 2. The distribution of Kakwani index (KI) during the 
study time (1988-2014), 22 years before and 5 years after TSL, 
Targeted Subsidies Law (TSL) implementation (2010).
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of the TSL. Although previous studies have found an increas-
ing InR and a decreasing trend in the GDP [33], some have re-
ported a positive association between InR and income in-
equality [34]. However, the reduction in income inequality 
may be due to at least 2 reasons: the effects of the recently in-
troduced TSL reform and the lag of the effect of the InR on in-
come inequality. The reduction in income inequality after the 
implementation of the TSL indicates the conformity of the re-
form with its planned objectives of redistributing wealth and 
reducing income inequality among citizens. Several other 
studies have reported that subsidies and reducing taxation re-
sulted in equitable income distributions [23]. 
Equity in healthcare financing is one of the main indicators 
of sound healthcare system performance [25]. Our study re-
vealed a progressive healthcare financing trend over time, 
which is consistent with progressive healthcare insurance pay-
ments (positive slope of the KI) [4,35]. Furthermore, a positive 
KI, indicating improvements in health expenditures, was also 
reported [3,36]. In contrast, studies in Iran and other develop-
ing countries have reported regressive healthcare financing, 
indicating that low-income households pay more for health-
care than others [35,37]. 
The segmented regression analysis in our study did not 
show a significant effect of TSL on equity in healthcare financ-
ing (KI). However, this study revealed a positive trend in the KI 
before the introduction of the TSL. This may have been due to 
other health sector-related reforms introduced before the TSL 
implementation, as well as the lack of proper implementation 
of the TSL and insufficient funds paid to the health system [18]. 
Another study reported that equity-based healthcare reform 
significantly reduced income-related inequality [38]. More-
over, studies have shown positive effects of economic or 
health system reforms on equity in healthcare financing [39]. 
Hu et al. [39], in a study of employment practices, taxation, 
and workers’ health/welfare benefit coverage in China that 
evaluated the effects of the enterprise reform on workers’ 
healthcare benefits and their financial burden due to medical 
expenses, concluded that the reform reduced workers’ out-of-
pocket expenditures [39]. These variations could be related to 
the focus of our study on the effects of general economic re-
forms on healthcare financing, whereas other studies assessed 
the effects of reforms that were primarily focused on the 
health sector. 
This study was based on survey data from a large sample (31 
000-36 000 households annually) retrieved from the reports of 
the Statistical Center of Iran and other national and interna-
tional reports for the years 1977-2014. Hence, the findings can 
be generalized to the entire population of Iran. The KI was 
used in this study, as it is a commonly used indicator for assess-
ing equity in healthcare financing [4]. Using segmented re-
gression analysis was a strength of this study, as it is a powerful 
method of interrupted time series analysis [21]. Segmented re-
gression analysis requires multiple observations before and af-
ter a single intervention [27]. However, the presence of fewer 
observations after the TSL implementation might have limited 
the detection of the real effect of the TSL on income inequality 
and equity in healthcare financing. Additionally, several addi-
tional control variables could have been included in this study, 
but due to the lack of access to data on control variables or 
their incompleteness in the time frame of the present study 
(1977-2014), only the InR and GDP were used as control vari-
ables for examining the effect of the TSL on the Gini coeffi-
cient, and the IMR and the PoU60 were used as control vari-
ables for examining the effect of the TSL on the KI.
The study investigated the effects of the TSL on equity in 
healthcare financing and on income inequality since 2010 in 
Iran. The segmented regression analysis revealed that the TSL 
did not show a significant effect on equity in healthcare fi-
nancing, although income inequality decreased after the im-
plementation of the TSL. The KI showed that the equity in 
healthcare financing has improved over time. This finding sug-
gests that economic reforms, such as the TSL, may have a pro-
gressive effect on equity in healthcare financing. Thus, consid-
ering the long-term effects of the TSL on equity in healthcare 
financing and other related health system indicators is of para-
mount importance for healthcare decision-makers. 
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